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SYRIZA’s electoral rise in Greece: protest, trust and the art of political 
manipulation 
 
Abstract 
Between 2010 and 2015, a period of significant political change in Greece, the Coalition of 
the Radical Left (SYRIZA), a minor party, achieved and consolidated major party status. This 
article explores the role of political strategy in SYRIZA’s electoral success. It argues that 
contrary to accepted wisdom, targeting a ‘niche’ constituency or protesting against the 
establishment will not suffice for a minor party to make an electoral breakthrough. SYRIZA’s 
case demonstrates that unless a minor party is ready to claim that it is willing and able to 
take on government responsibility, electoral advancement will not be forthcoming. The 
success of SYRIZA’s strategy can be attributed to favourable electoral demand factors and 
apt heresthetic manipulation of issue dimensions. 
Keywords: SYRIZA, Tsipras, Memorandum, minor parties, radical left, Greek party system, 
heresthetics 
Word count: 11,947 
 
From a party lifespan perspective (Pedersen 1982), over the course of the last half century a 
swathe of minor parties have managed to cross both the threshold of representation and that 
of relevance, meaning that they have become parties with an established presence in 
legislative politics as well as parties with coalition potential or ‘blackmail’ potential if in 
opposition (Sartori 1976). Contrary to expectations that minor parties of the Green, radical 
left, regionalist of far right party families would advance to the point that they would 
eventually reshape Europe’s ‘frozen’ party systems (Webb 2005), by and large they have 
remained minor (Copus & al 2009). They remain, in Duverger’s terms, ‘merely makeweights’ 
with marginal support, resources and capacity to influence public policy (Duverger 1964, p. 
288).  
The electoral trajectory of SYRIZA, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left deviates from the 
aforementioned pattern. Before the economic crisis SYRIZA and its predecessor, 
Synaspismos, was a rooted (Bolleyer 2013) minor party that had achieved parliamentary 
representation since 1996 and had consolidated its electoral niche to a four per cent section 
of the vote on average by 2009. Less than three years later in the national elections of June 
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2012 SYRIZA achieved 26.6 per cent of the national vote and became the main party of 
opposition. In the national elections held just nine months later, in January 2015, SYRIZA 
became the main party of government capturing 36.3 per cent of the national vote. The case 
of SYRIZA can serve to illuminate the lesser known of the challenges that minor established 
parties such as Sinn Fein in Ireland, the Freedom Party of Austria and the French National 
Front face in becoming major parties. The case study of SYRIZA’s electoral rise will 
demonstrate that minor parties face significant obstacles that concern the supply side, in 
particular, difficult choices concerning the political strategies open to them. 
This article will focus on SYRIZA’s political strategy over the course of one of the most 
turbulent periods in Modern Greek political history which resulted in the overhaul of Greece’s 
party system with SYRIZA emerging as a major party. Between May 2010 and September 
2015 SYRIZA moved from an ‘issue ownership’ strategy, aimed at capturing an electoral 
niche, to a combined strategy of protest, aimed at mobilising the vote of the disaffected and 
competence, aimed at winning the vote of the majority. Such a strategy comprised, on the 
one hand, of an inclusive social-populist discourse (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014) and 
support for  anti-austerity social movements, and on the other hand, a technocratic discourse 
that portrayed the left as a more credible and honest contender for government than its 
predecessors (Tsakatika 2014). SYRIZA’s electoral success can be attributed to the fact that 
its choice of strategy constituted a more appropriate response to electoral demand when 
compared to the strategies its competitors as well as to the aptitude its leadership 
demonstrated in pursuing that strategy by engaging in heresthetic manipulation of issue 
dimensions (Riker 1986). The main argument will be that contrary to accepted wisdom, if a 
minor party aims to make an electoral breakthrough it will not suffice for it to claim 
‘ownership’ of a niche issue or to appeal to the disaffected; it will need to claim the vote of 
the many asserting its will and ability to govern. 
The first section of this article surveys the literature on the electoral success of minor parties 
and sets out the analytical framework. The second section examines the context within 
which SYRIZA’s electoral rise took place in Greece over the 2010-2015 period. Drawing on 
four semi-structured interviews with the key party strategists of the time held in June 2016 
and a number of party documents and speeches by the party’s leader the following sections 
examine SYRIZA’s strategy over the 2010-2015 period and the reasons behind its 
success. The conclusion summarises the argument and discusses the implications of the 
findings for the party literature. 
 
Political strategy and the electoral success of minor parties 
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Factors that work in favour of minor parties’ electoral success are known to include 
institutional enablers such as low minimum requirements for parliament entry, enhanced 
proportionality of the electoral system and a high degree of state decentralisation (Lijphart 
1994; Massetti & Schakel 2013) as well as certain demand side factors, such as changes in 
social values (Kitschelt 1988), anti-party sentiments when directed towards established 
parties (Belanger 2004), changes in public attitudes towards immigration (Norris 2005), and 
particularly in the case of left parties increasing unemployment, rising levels of 
Euroscepticism or a historical legacy of left support (March & Rommerskirtchen 2014).  
Going beyond the formal ‘rules of the game’ and the contours of electoral demand, a number 
of studies have pointed out the decisive importance of party agency in what concerns the 
strategies major parties adopt when they compete for votes with minor parties (Meguid 
2005). Likewise, the strategies minor parties adopt to deal with the consequences of major 
parties’ choices also matter greatly for electoral success. Minor parties, according to Norris 
(2005), have three strategic options in order to increase their share of the vote: they may 
compete with major parties on mainstream, competence issues (i.e. economy, security, etc) 
claiming that they would do a better job; they may protest against the record of major parties 
or they may claim the ‘ownership’ of issues that are not prioritised by major parties because 
they lie outside the ‘zone of acquiescence’.  
For Norris, the competence strategy is the least likely to succeed given the lack of expertise, 
lack of government experience and credibility of minor parties which does not militate in 
favour of convincing the median voter. In comparative perspective radical left parties (RLPs) 
have attempted to gain credibility by becoming junior government partners. This has 
generally not been an electorally successful strategy for them. In their study of European 
RLPs in government between 1990 and 2010 Olsen & al (2010, p. 182) demonstrate that 
where an RLP has entered a coalition government it has lost on average 25 per cent of its 
vote share. Major parties will tend to present government success as their own while minor 
parties struggle to demonstrate their positive and distinct contribution. 
The protest strategy may be more promising for minor parties’ electoral success but for 
Norris it is a risky strategy; the vote of the disaffected may be claimed by other parties as 
well. As noted already a decade ago, some RLPs will deploy social populist Manichean 
discourses in order to mobilise ‘us’, the pure people, versus ‘them’, the corrupt elites (March 
& Mudde 2004) in pursuit of electoral success. Parties such as Die Linke or the Dutch 
Socialist Party that have used left populist arguments have indeed had highly successful 
albeit volatile electoral performance (Keith & March 2015). Joint mobilisations with social 
movements and grassroots organisations are also important in RLPs’ electoral strategies. 
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Both populist discourse and grassroots mobilisation are more effective when RLPs are in 
opposition (Tsakatika & Lisi 2013).  
The best chances of electoral success for minor parties, in Norris’ view, come from the 
strategy of claiming ownership of issue gaps left by major parties (Norris 2005, pp. 6-7). The 
aim of this strategy is to capture the votes of marginal, or ‘niche’, groups. RLPs have tried 
the ‘issue ownership’ strategy, particularly with issues such as defence of the welfare state 
(Olsen et al 2011), or the rights of precarious workers, young people or immigrants while in 
government as a junior partner or while in opposition, with varied electoral success. This is 
the ‘safest’ strategy, although it might be argued that it also has its weaknesses. For 
instance, if major parties perceive a growing threat they may decide to appropriate rather 
than accommodate the minor party’s message (Bale 2003).   
Insightful selection and seamless implementation of one or more of these strategies will not 
necessarily lead a minor political party to electoral success, given that such parties face 
fierce competition for electoral space by other parties with strategies of their own. Minor 
parties’ strategic endeavours are particularly ridden with obstacles due to the very limited 
ability they have to determine the terrain upon which electoral competition is to take place 
compared to major parties. However all is not lost. Riker’s concept of ‘heresthetics’ is useful 
here. ‘Heresthetics’ refers to a set of tactical manoeuvres which allow persistent ‘losers’ to 
be transformed into ‘winners’ in politics (Shepsle 2003). Heresthetics is about ‘structuring the 
world so you can win’ or striving to ‘alter decisively the strategic context in which he or she 
finds him or herself so as to render it more amenable to strategies for realising his or her 
intentions’ (Hay 2009, p. 276) by controlling agendas, strategic voting or manipulating issue-
dimensionality (increasing or reducing the number of relevant issue dimensions) in public 
debate (McLean 2002). It is particularly the latter that politicians engage with more regularly. 
The heresthetic move that can be expected of a party that expects to lose an electoral 
contest would be that of modifying the number of salient issue dimensions (Riker 1986, pp. 
1–9). On the contrary, a party that expects to win will strive to fix the number of existing 
salient issue dimensions and avoid the emergence of a new dimension that would divide the 
majority that the party commands (Riker 1986, pp. 66–76).  
It will be shown that while SYRIZA and its minor party competitors faced the same 
institutional constraints, SYRIZA’s electoral strategy was the winning one for two reasons. 
First, because its choice of strategy met demand side factors to a greater extent than the 
strategies of its minor competitors. Secondly, because using the manipulation of issue 
dimensions successfully SYRIZA laid the groundwork for its electoral strategy to bear fruit. In 
so doing, SYRIZA beat the odds, transforming itself from ‘loser’ to ‘winner’. 
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SYRIZA’s electoral rise: the context 
There is no denying that SYRIZA’s electoral rise took place under exceptional 
circumstances. When PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement - Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό 
Κίνημα] won the 2009 national elections by a landslide, the extent of the vulnerability of the 
Greek economy to the global economic crisis was not widely perceived. The announcement 
of upwards revised figures of the Greek public deficit by the incoming Minister of Finance 
initiated a confidence crisis in the Greek economy, one that led to the country’s inability to 
finance its public debt through borrowing from international financial markets. The 
government requested the assistance of the European Union (EU) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and soon, the First Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), setting out 
an extensive package of austerity measures and structural reforms that Greece would need 
to implement in return for a 110 billion euro ‘bail-out’ loan, was signed on 8 May 2010 
between the Greek government led by Prime Minister (PM) George Papandreou and the 
Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, IMF).  
Greece’s two-party system featuring the centre-left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy  
that had dominated the country’s politics for 40 years (Pappas 2013) was already in a 
process of transformation. At least since 2007 Greek bipartyism was in decline, in terms of 
the total share of the vote that the two main parties commanded, party identification and the 
levels of trust that citizens placed in the political system (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2014, pp. 
224-228). However, it was only after the ratification of the May 2010 bail-out agreement by 
the Greek Parliament that a domino effect was triggered whose outcome would be the 
complete reshaping of the party system between 2010 and 2015.  
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Graph 1 Greek National Election Results, 2004-2015 %
 
Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior, available at: 
http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/NationalElections/Results/ 
 
As a result of MP defections, party splits and multiple electoral contests within this period, 
SYRIZA has been transformed from an established but minor party in the Greek party 
system that did not much exceed the three per cent threshold of parliamentary 
representation into a major party, commanding the largest share of the vote in Greece, while 
PASOK, the major party of the centre left between 1981 and 2012, has been relegated to 
minor party status. The centre-right New Democracy remains a major party but has been 
significantly downsized. In the meantime, the parties that acted as junior government 
partners to PASOK and New Democracy between 2010 and 2015 effectively disappeared 
from the political map (the far right LAOS [Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός – Laikos 
Orthodoxos Synagermos] and the moderate left DIMAR [Δημοκρατική Αριστερά - 
Democratiki Aristera). New parties have emerged such as nationalist right Independent 
Greeks [Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες] and centrist The River [Το Ποτάμι]) while minor parties that 
were unsuccessful before the crisis seem to have found their niche, such as far right Golden 
Dawn [Χρυσή Αυγή - Chrysi Avgi] and Centre Union [Ένωση Κέντρου - Enosi Kentrou]. Of 
the pre-2012 minor parties, only the KKE Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος - Communist Party 
of Greece) has remained largely stable in terms of its electoral appeal. A new bipartyism 
(Nicolacopoulos & Martín 2015) or ‘polarised pluralism’ (Tsirbas 2015) whose main 
protagonists are SYRIZA and New Democracy seems to have crystallised at the time of 
writing (Graph 1).  
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SYRIZA’s electoral rise took place in two steps. The first was between the aforementioned 
signing of the first MoU in May 2010 and the twin ‘earthquake’ elections of May and June 
2012 that saw SYRIZA become main party of opposition in Greece (Voulgaris & 
Nicolakopoulos 2014) and the second between 2012 and 2015 when SYRIZA won a 
European election (2014) and two national elections (January and September 2015) 
becoming main party of government (Eleftheriou 2015).  
 
Table 1 SYN and SYRIZA’s Results in National Elections (1992-2015), % vote & seats/300  
Source: Greek Ministry of the Interior, available at: 
http://www.ypes.gr/en/Elections/NationalElections/Results/ 
Note: Until 2000 the results refer to the party of Synaspismos. Between 2004 and 2012a the results refer to the 
SYRIZA coalition of which Synaspismos was a founding member and main component. From 2012b onwards 
SYRIZA competed in elections as a unified party. 
 
Despite its robust parliamentary opposition and negative vote to the First MoU, SYRIZA did 
not improve its electoral performance in the 2010 local and regional elections. A year of 
harsh austerity measures associated with the First MoU was followed by the emergence of 
the movement of the squares (the Outraged) in the summer of 2011 that had SYRIZA’s full 
support. As the public debt skyrocketed, the economy continued to contract and 
unemployment reached a record 17 per cent, the autumn of 2011 saw the government 
negotiate a second loan and MoU with the country’s lenders. On the occasion of the national 
celebration of Greek refusal to submit to Italian rule on 28 October 1940 (which signaled 
Greece’s entry in WW2) mass spontaneous anti-government demonstrations broke out 
across the country. Within two days, on the 30th of October the PM announced a referendum 
whereby the people would have their say on the second MoU. SYRIZA was not in favour of 
the referendum, urging the government to abolish the Memorandum and associated 
measures via the parliamentary route instead. Under pressure from the EU PM Papandreou 
withdrew his decision to hold a referendum and despite narrowly winning a vote of 
confidence in Parliament resigned his office a few days later to give way to a transitional 
 1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012a  2012b 2015a 2015b 
Seats - 10 6 6 14 13 
 
52 
 
71 
 
149 
 
145 
   %  2.9 5.12 3.20 3.26 5.04  4.60 16.8 27.8 36.3 35.5 
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government under former European Central Bank (ECB) Vice President Loukas 
Papademos. SYRIZA called this a ‘blatant distortion of popular sovereignty’ and called for 
elections (Tsipras 2011). SYRIZA exercised poignant opposition and did not support the new 
government in the Parliament.  
As the Papademos government (supported by PASOK, ND and LAOS) ratified the 2nd MoU 
in February 2012 and several majority MPs defected, SYRIZA called for a ‘Government of 
the Left’. Elections were called for May 2012 in which SYRIZA came second, increasing its 
vote to 16.3 per cent, ahead of PASOK (13 per cent) and just behind New Democracy (19 
per cent). SYRIZA rejected Samaras’ invitation to form a coalition government of national 
unity and the country was led to a new election in June 2012. Before the June election 
SYRIZA declared it would not co-operate with any of the parties that had agreed to the 
MoUs. In June SYRIZA increased its vote share to 26.6 per cent assuming the role of official 
opposition to the coalition government of PASOK, ND and DIMAR that resulted.  
 
Table 2 Timeline of Events 
September 2009  National election – PASOK victory, SYRIZA at 4.6 per cent. 
May 2010 1st MoU approved in Parliament – SYRIZA votes against. 
November 2010 
 
May 2011 
October 2011 
November 2011 
Regional and local elections - SYRIZA supports Alexis Mitropoulos in 
the Attica Region with modest results. 
Emergence of the Outraged – SYRIZA supports the movement.  
The PM announces a referendum on the 2nd MoU – SYRIZA is against.  
Collapse of the PASOK government, appointment of the Papademos 
government (supported by PASOK, New Democracy and LAOS) – 
SYRIZA does not offer vote of confidence, calls for elections.  
February 2012 2nd MoU approved in Parliament – SYRIZA votes against. 
May 2012 National election – SYRIZA becomes second party with 16.8 per cent 
and refuses to participate in government of national unity with ND, 
PASOK and DIMAR. 
June 2012 National election – SYRIZA gains 27.8 per cent and becomes the official 
opposition. 
May 2014 European and regional/local elections – SYRIZA wins the European 
elections with 26.6 per cent, wins Attika Region and comes a close 
second in the Athens municipality.  
December 2014 Election for the President of the Republic by the Greek Parliament – 
SYRIZA does not support the government’s candidate Dimas, the 
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Parliament is dissolved. 
January 2015 
 
June 2015 
National election – SYRIZA wins with 36.3 per cent. The first SYRIZA-
ANEL government under PM Alexis Tsipras is sworn in. 
Capital controls, failure to meet IMF payment, the government calls a 
referendum on the agreement proposed by the Troika – SYRIZA 
supports NO. 
July 2015 
 
NO wins by 61.31% - The first SYRIZA-ANEL government agrees to a 
Third MoU.  
August 2015 3rd MoU approved in Parliament – SYRIZA splits with 32 of its MPs 
voting against and 11 abstaining. 
September 2015 National election – SYRIZA wins with 35.5 per cent. The second 
SYRIZA-ANEL government is sworn in. 
 
 
Ahead of the 2014 European elections Alexis Tsipras stood as candidate for Commission 
President nominated by the Party of the European Left. SYRIZA ran the campaigns for the 
European elections and the local and regional elections of 2014 (which coincided) in 
tandem. The final election rallies were held under the same theme: ‘Three ballot boxes, one 
option: victory!’ with Tsipras as lead candidate for Commission President, Rena Dourou as 
candidate for the Attica region and Gabriel Sakellarides as candidate for the municipality of 
Athens appearing in the same podium. SYRIZA won the European election (its first 
nationwide victory) and the Attica region and came a very close second in Athens (Tsirbas 
2015). 
In November 2014 the term of the President of the Republic was up and the Parliament held 
an election for his replacement. SYRIZA refused to provide its support to the candidate 
proposed by New Democracy and PASOK, moderate centre right former Commissioner 
Stavros Dimas, and the required supermajority was not achieved. The Parliament was 
dissolved and the country was led to national elections in January 2015. SYRIZA won the 
elections gaining 35.3 per cent of the vote and was only two seats short of a parliamentary 
majority. After the Communist Party of Greece refused to back a ‘Government of the Left’, 
SYRIZA formed a coalition government with nationalist right, but strongly anti-MoU 
Independent Greeks. A team of key government ministers under Tsipras himself including 
the Deputy PM Giannis Dragasakis, Finance Minister Yiannis Varoufakis and the deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Euclid Tsakalotos proceeded to renegotiate the bail-out 
settlement. The government’s aims were a major write-off of the Greek debt, a loosening of 
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fiscal policy and a push back of a number of unsavory labour market and social security 
reforms and privatisations.  
After seven months of inconclusive negotiations and a halt to bailout tranches being 
disbursed, Greek public coffers were empty and the government under immense pressure 
from the country’s creditors. Being handed what he called an ultimatum by the Eurogroup 
Alexis Tsipras and his team of negotiators left Brussels on the 27th of June and called a 
referendum for the 6th of July on the new bail-out package that the Troika had put on the 
table which included a Third MoU. On the 28th of June the government introduced capital 
controls and on the 30th of June the country failed to meet its debt repayment to the IMF. 
Before the referendum SYRIZA called for an anti-austerity and pro-democracy No vote, 
while the opposition (PASOK, ND and The River) along with the grassroots ‘Remain in 
Europe’ campaign rallied for a Yes vote on the grounds that failing to comply with the 
creditors’ proposals Greece was risking a rough exit from the Eurozone and ultimately its 
place in the European Union. Tsipras won the referendum with an unexpected 61 per cent of 
the vote only to capitulate to European Council proposals under the threat of Greece being 
forced out of the Eurozone two days later.   
Conceding defeat, in August 2015 SYRIZA took the Third MoU through Parliament with 
numerous defections from amongst its own ranks. A party split followed with SYRIZA’s hard 
Eurosceptic wing exiting to form a new party, Popular Unity. Appealing to the loss of support 
from his MPS in Parliament and the need for the government to renew its mandate after its 
defeat in the negotiations Tsipras called a new election in September 2015. SYRIZA 
contested the September elections claiming it would turn its focus to the domestic ‘front’, 
implement a ‘parallel programme’ to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, introduce measures to 
deepen democracy and ‘clean up’ Greece’s corrupt clientelist system. Despite the U-turn 
that SYRIZA performed it won the elections by 35.5 per cent of the vote consolidating major 
party status. A second SYRIZA-ANEL government was formed to take the helm of the 
country and implement the Third MoU. The following sections attempt to explain SYRIZA’s 
electoral trajectory by analysing the evolution of its political strategy throughout the 2010-
2015 period and the factors that rendered it successful.   
 
Crafting the strategy: ‘protest’ and ‘competence’ 
Issue Ownership 
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SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς - Coalition of the Radical Left) was an 
electoral and political alliance between the democratic socialist, former Eurocommunist party 
of Synaspismos (Συνασπισμός της Αριστεράς, της Οικολογίας και των Κινημάτων- Coalition 
of the Left, Ecology and Movements) and a host of other minor parties, groups and 
personalities of the extra parliamentary left, that contested elections in Greece between 
March 2004 and May 2012. After the May 2012 national elections SYRIZA was transformed 
into a unified political party. Throughout the lifespan of the SYRIZA coalition Synaspismos 
remained its largest and most influential component (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 2013). 
SYRIZA’s origins are to be found in 2001 when the leaders of the coalition’s original 
components announced the formation of a ‘Space for Dialogue and Common Action of the 
Left’ (SDCAL) aimed at providing the political groundwork for the unification of the Greek left 
and an organizational platform for its participation in the Global Justice Movement (GJM) of 
the early 21st century (SYN 2001). 
Inspired by the onset of the Global Justice Movement, in the context of the drive to reunify 
the Left that the SYRIZA coalition represented and mindful especially of the experience of 
the French Communist Party’s participation in both the Mitterand (1981-1984) and Jospin 
(1997-2002) centre-left coalition governments that was assessed to be instrumental for the 
PCF’s electoral decline (Interview 4), the leadership of Synaspismos had become convinced  
that for the Greek radical left: 
 ‘electoral survival or improvement would go through developing links with the social 
movements and the younger generation and not through participation in government’ 
(Interview 1).  
Joining and remaining engaged in the SDCAL was itself an attempt to develop and express 
those links at the political level for Synaspismos. Hence, from 2004 when SYRIZA replaced 
the SDCAL it adopted an ‘issue ownership’ strategy addressed to the youth alongside a 
protest strategy. SYRIZA appealed to a section of young urban voters strategically (Balafas 
2012, p. 268) through their engagement with the GJM (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 2013) but 
also by selecting Alexis Tsipras, a 34 year old former leader of the Synaspismos Youth Wing 
to be its President in 2009.  
SYRIZA’s protest strategy was evident in its chosen approach towards social mobilisations, 
which involved the: 
‘core choice to be present in all social movement activity…it is a movement-party that always 
participates in what happens on the ground and tries to bring that to the political level without 
taking over the social movements’ (Interview 4).  
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 At the level of public discourse SYRIZA’s protest strategy was articulated via a scathing 
critique of international capitalism, by adopting a version of soft Euroscepticism and by 
vehemently rejecting any future government coalition with PASOK as a junior partner 
(Tsakatika 2009). While both ‘issue ownership’ and ‘protest’ strategies helped SYRIZA 
consolidate its electoral share and modest but stable parliamentary representation and 
renew its cadre pool, none of the two had paid additional electoral dividends. The party’s 
performance in the national elections of 2009, which PASOK won by a landslide, was slightly 
lower in comparison with the previous 2007 election (Table 1).  
 
Protest 
The period between June 2011 and June 2012, was characterised by very high levels of 
social mobilisation and electoral volatility (Rudig & Karyotis 2014). Over the course of that 
period SYRIZA abandoned its ‘issue ownership’ strategy that had targeted a niche youth 
constituency and refocused its protest strategy, aiming to mobilise the discontent of the 
extensive social strata that were being adversely affected by the austerity measures 
associated with the MoU (Katsambekis 2015).  
Continuity with SYRIZA’s pre-2010 protest strategy was obvious in its refusal to act as a 
government partner to the parties that had ruled the country before the crisis, its ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptic position and most importantly, the types of mobilisation it continued to privilege, 
i.e. its support of strikes, street demonstrations and extra parliamentary co-operation with 
protest movements (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 2013). SYRIZA members took part 
wholeheartedly in the strikes, anti-austerity protests and social movements that emerged 
from the crisis, particularly the mass movement of ‘the squares’ or the Outraged 
[Αγανακτισμένοι] of Syntagma Square in June 2011, which involved daily anti-government 
protests against austerity and in advocacy of direct democratic practices (Sotirakopoulos & 
Sotiropoulos 2013). The SYRIZA party itself acted as the Outraged movement’s political 
representative and advocate in the Parliament and the mass media (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 
2013). Through the participation of its activists in the Outraged movement SYRIZA also 
expanded its social reach. In the words of a SYRIZA strategist:   
‘In the squares it was easy for a political milieu that was already constituted (SYRIZA) to 
become hegemonic. In something that is so fluid and spontaneous and a first for a vast part 
of the people, in all this aura of direct democracy and Assemblies...our people were there 
anyway...there was no (formal party) decision to be there, we were just there’ (Interview 2).  
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Furthermore, SYRIZA’s support for the solidarity networks and initiatives that developed at 
the local level and involved many SYRIZA members, particularly between 2010 and 2012 
through its MP-funded NGO 'Solidarity 4 All' was another aspect of the party’s support for 
extra parliamentary mobilisation. Solidarity for All acts as a hub for the mapping, networking 
and support of solidarity initiatives across the country involved in the distribution of food, 
provision of health and public education services, or management of employment 
collectives, occupied parks and other public spaces (Vaiou & Kalandides 2016, pp. 463-
464).  
According to a key SYRIZA strategist, after the 2012 elections the levels of spontaneous 
social mobilisation diminished. This can be attributed to ‘a logic of delegation on behalf of 
SYRIZA supporters’ (Interview 4) who could now see the probability of SYRIZA being the 
next government and addressing the claims of the social movements from a position of 
power. Nonetheless, to the extent that popular protest did take place, up until the eve of the 
national elections of September 2015 SYRIZA continued to support and voice the claims of 
social movements in political debate. For instance, the demonstrations outside the national 
broadcaster (ERT) that was shut down virtually overnight by order of the PM Antonis 
Samaras in June 2013, was a key instance of protest against the authoritarian bent that the 
governing ‘elites’ had taken according to SYRIZA. Alexis Tsipras as leader of the opposition 
attended them himself. Likewise in 2014 SYRIZA supported local environmental protests in 
the Chalkidiki region of Northern Greece against the government decision to allow mining by 
Canadian gold-mining company Eldorado Gold (Panayiotakis 2015).  
However, August 2015 marked a turning point in SYRIZA’s protest strategy from the point of 
view of its approach to social mobilisation. It became much more difficult for the party to 
retain its profile as the privileged interlocutor and vocaliser of the claims of anti-austerity 
social movements once its leadership is in government implementing unpopular austerity 
measures linked to the Third MoU.   
Alongside continuity, SYRIZA’s protest strategy also underwent change. The novelty was its 
discursive shift towards left populism (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014). SYRIZA attempted 
to dichotomise political space by introducing a Manichean distinction between the ‘pure’ 
people and the ‘corrupt’ elites (Mudde 2004), with SYRIZA understood as part of the people. 
A prominent example came in the electoral campaign for the May 2012 elections where one 
of the core slogans on a very popular series of posters was ‘Us or them’, which deliberately 
aimed to:  
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‘lay down the dividing line and locate SYRIZA not in terms of the political personnel, i.e. 
‘SYRIZA or New Democracy’, but in terms of the social division ‘us’ (the many) or them 
(those who have brought us to this point)’ (Interview 4). 
This was accompanied by constant references to the need to address the ‘humanitarian 
crisis’ that affected a third of the population by extending welfare rights, support for direct 
democratic engagement through the ‘movement’ and frequent mention of the ‘dignity’ of the 
Greek people and their struggles which must be defended against a corrupt domestic elite 
that colludes with the foreign elites of Northern Europe (in particular Germany/Merkel). An 
analysis of SYRIZA’s 2014 European election manifesto points out that the discourse 
employed to describe ‘us’ made as much reference to popular sovereignty (the people) and 
the left (movement, SYRIZA, the left) as to national sovereignty (Greeks, the nation) 
(Tsakatika, Graziano & Font 2015).  
SYRIZA’s appeal to ‘our people’ was an appeal to: 
‘The 99 per cent... all those who are affected by the economic crisis. The lower middle class 
is also hit by the crisis. Even industrialists are hit by the crisis... Everyone is hit by the crisis 
and hence ‘the people’ takes a very broad meaning. It goes much beyond the people of the 
left’ (Interview 1).  
Nonetheless, SYRIZA’s populist discourse did draw its inspiration from past successful 
experiences of broad left unity particularly focusing its discourse and symbols on presenting 
SYRIZA as the historical successor to the National Liberation Front (EAM) (1941-1944) 
(Panagiotopoulos 2012). EAM was the political wing of the broad, egalitarian mass 
movement of youth, women and men that organised the civilian and armed resistance 
against German occupation, effectively led by the Communist Party of Greece (Mazower 
2001). The frontline presence of Manolis Glezos, octogenarian hero of the resistance against 
German Occupation in the ranks of SYRIZA, the multiple symbolic references to EAM and 
particular events that occurred during the resistance period (the execution of 200 Greeks by 
the Nazis in Kaisariani, a neighbourhood still considered one of Athens’ ‘red’ strongholds), 
the constant reminders of the unresolved (according to SYRIZA) question of German war 
reparations, the linkage between Solidarity4All and the legacy of EAM, whose strong priority, 
particularly during the first years, was the distribution of food and medical supplies to the 
destitute population of Athens and the countryside (Mazower 2001) were central to the 
symbolic construction of SYRIZA’s discursive offensive. They were core elements of a 
narrative that presented SYRIZA as EAM’s heroic, patriotic and unitary successor, the 
‘people’ as the broadest possible constituency of the left and the ‘other’ (domestic and 
European) against which protest was directed as German.  
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Competence 
In July 2011, four months before the collapse of the Papandreou government but already in 
the turbulent context of its decline, SYRIZA held a crucial meeting of its Central Committee 
where the notion of a ‘coalition of political and social forces’ that would claim government 
responsibility was first put forward. At its core the ‘coalition of social and political forces’ 
involved the mobilisation of a social constituency comprising:  
‘the forces of labour, knowledge and culture’ and ‘a coalition of left political forces, such as 
SYRIZA’ (Interview 3). 
In that meeting all party factions converged on the need to change the party’s electoral 
strategy from a primarily protest strategy to a strategy that also involved claiming 
government responsibility: 
‘...the destruction is too overwhelming, we cannot proceed only with the movement, the 
movement cannot win and we must proceed to the next stage... everyone agreed. All of 
SYRIZA’s components. It was an escape forward in a phase where the movement practices 
we were familiar with did not seem to work... because society achieved the greatest possible 
movement twice in 2011. In every town, in every village the people were on the streets. It hit 
the roof. Municipal bands were playing EAM songs, there was the big demonstration of 
Patras… the whole country was in a state of madness. There was nothing more that could 
be done (in terms of protest). And the Memorandum was approved. And so we said that this 
cannot be stopped only with the movement. We must move on to the second phase 
(Interview 1).’   
This was the background to the concept of a ‘Government of the Left’ which SYRIZA 
proposed when it stepped forward and claimed government responsibility for itself on the run 
up to the May 2012 national elections (Eleftheriou 2015, p. 65). It is very difficult to 
understand SYRIZA’s electoral success without the claim for government responsibility 
articulated in terms of the ‘Government of the Left’: 
 ‘In the (first) 2012 (elections) we were aiming for a two digit result, ten, eleven, thirteen per 
cent... but we came across a phenomenon that took the form of a wave…This must be 
associated with what was going on in society in the meantime, our relationship with the 
social movements, the squares, all of that…but if I must isolate one factor (that explains 
electoral success) I believe that the Left appears as a force that says: good morning to you, 
we are here and we can take over the government of the country. Without this, in my view, 
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we may have had an increase in our percentage around ten per cent, but I do not think that 
we would have this leap, this take-off’ (Interview 3). 
SYRIZA’s claim for government responsibility was coupled with the introduction of a 
competence strategy alongside its protest strategy. The main aim of this strategy was to 
strengthen the credibility of SYRIZA as a potential party of government given that it had had 
no substantial experience of government up to that point. SYRIZA tried to show that it had 
the best plan to lead the country out of the crisis and the best people to take that plan 
forward, facing an uphill struggle on both counts.  
SYRIZA was a party of the radical left that was forced to come up with a plan for government 
having had ‘no international point of reference or paradigm to point to’ (Interview 2). 
SYRIZA’s 500 page long programme, ‘For the Left of the 21st Century’ that had been 
approved by extraordinary Conference in 2009 made references to an ‘economy of needs’ 
and declared nationalising strategic economic sectors, developing the social economy and 
relocating resources to productive sectors such as agriculture, education, research and the 
environment as key objectives (SYN 2009). SYRIZA was a party that had neither been nor 
had expected to be in government until very recently and this was reflected in the general, 
declaratory and idealistic language of its 2009 programme.  
After the May 2012 elections, as it was becoming clear that SYRIZA’s plan would be under 
close scrutiny due to its electoral success, SYRIZA shifted the emphasis from declaring their 
intention to ‘scrap’ the MoUs, or as Alexis Tsipras put it in a well-known turn of phrase in 
Parliament in November 2012 ‘abolish (it) with one law and in one article’ (Tsipras 2012a, p. 
4541) to ‘renegotiating the Memorandum’ and ‘replacing’ it with a ‘national plan of economic 
reconstruction’ (Dragasakis 2012), based on the 2009 programme (Tsipras 2012b).  
A standing Programme Committee was set up in 2013, after it became clear in the June 
2012 elections that there was a real possibility for SYRIZA to be entrusted with Greece’s 
government, consisting of party cadres, parliamentarians and associated experts to refine 
the party’s programme and render it fit for purpose (Dragasakis 2014). In the context of the 
September 2014 Thessaloniki international fair, Tsipras put forward what became known as 
the Thessaloniki Programme meant to further specify what SYRIZA would do immediately 
upon winning national government. In the ‘internal’ front it would introduce emergency 
measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote tax justice, create jobs and introduce 
measures to deepen democracy. In the ‘external’ front it would demand a policy of 
‘quantitative easing’ by the ECB, a public investment plan financed by the EIB, a European 
conference on South European debt and to be allowed to run a balanced budget rather than 
a budget in primary surplus (SYRIZA 2014). In brief, SYRIZA’s plan was to renegotiate the 
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terms of the bail out agreements with the creditors while remaining in a reformed Eurozone. 
This was a palatable idea ridden with contradictions (Dinas & Rori 2012). It assumed a 
positive response of the creditors to SYRIZA’s demands while proclaiming the intention to 
remain in the Eurozone independently of the creditors’ response. It also assumed that 
SYRIZA’s victory would inspire a pan-European progressive alliance that would rally behind 
reform in the direction of a more social and democratic European Union while heavily 
criticising European social democracy for its rightward drift. 
Alongside the effort to project SYRIZA as having a plan to rescue the country, the party 
emphasised the technical ability and the honesty of its cadres. Before and during the 2012 
electoral campaigns a number of prominent economists that held important positions in the 
party’s leadership (Tsakalotos, Dragasakis, Milios, Stathakis, Sakellarides) took the heavy 
onus of presenting, explaining and debating the party’s economic strategy in the mass media 
while attacking the mainstream parties’ economic strategies with knowledgeable, technically 
sound and politically sophisticated arguments. The economists that mounted SYRIZA’s front 
line of attack were not just ‘technocrats’; most were seasoned politicians and/or political 
activists with a long presence in Greek public life. However their technical knowledge was 
meant to inspire confidence among the voters of the left as well as among the citizens that 
switched their vote to SYRIZA and lent credence to the idea of a ‘government of the left’:  
‘There was a need for whoever went (to the media) to know what they are talking about...to 
be well prepared…to show that there is something more solid than what all the others were 
proposing...and for what we proposed to appear as reasonable...that what SYRIZA says is 
the sober and reasonable claim of a society that cannot continue with the failed programme 
that is destroying it after five years...and they (the economists) emanated this message and 
a knowledge of what was going on from the economic side...were another cadre to go they 
would find that difficult...that was it…there was the need at the time to appear to know what 
you were talking about. Not that the party could fully control (who appeared in the media), 
only to a certain extent...but yes, insofar as we could implement it, yes there was that line’ 
(Interview 1).   
Despite these prominent economists’ presence in the 2012 electoral campaigns, the pool of 
experienced SYRIZA cadres that could staff the parliamentary group, the political aides and 
advisors’ positions and – after January 2015 – the Greek government was extremely limited 
given that SYRIZA had been a minor party whose vote share barely reached five per cent 
until the eve of the 2012 elections. Indicatively, between the 2009 and June 2012 elections 
the number of SYRIZA MPs increased from 13 to 71. Despite the fact that most MPs had 
previously held elected positions in local government, trade unions or other collective bodies 
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(Koltsida 2013, p. 45-56) and could hence be argued to have had some degree of 
management experience, only 20 per cent had previous parliamentary experience. The 
composition of both SYRIZA led governments in 2015 involved a significant number of 
prominent technocrats or professionals external to the party broadly supportive of the left 
who were called upon to lend their credentials to the government, not least Yiannis 
Varoufakis, Finance Minister until July 2015. 
The lack of experience of most SYRIZA cadres in posts of responsibility was a double edged 
sword when it came to credibility. On the one hand SYRIZA could claim that having had no 
government experience meant its cadres were not corrupt and hence could be trusted to run 
the country; They were inexperienced but they were ‘new faces’ that had not been involved 
in the clientelist spoils system that PASOK and New Democracy had built over the 
democratic period (Pappas 2013). On the other hand being new to professional politics its 
cadres were not recognised by voters, therefore SYRIZA’s opponents could claim that they 
had no experience to run the country.  
Within the SYRIZA leadership a difference of opinion (cutting across party factions) had 
been at work since the regional elections of 2010 on how to deal with this conundrum. At the 
time, the party decided to support the candidacy of Alexis Mitropoulos, a former PASOK 
member and prominent labour lawyer, for the leadership of the Attica region, the most 
populated and most politically significant in the country. Part of the leadership believed that:  
‘the (Radical) Left cannot become the majority, ergo it needs to break off a part of social 
democracy which it must reposition on the Left and working together with them will take us to 
the government’ (Interview 1).  
This did not entail a formal coalition strategy with the crumbling PASOK but rather it meant 
that recognisable cadres that leave PASOK would be welcome to collaborate with SYRIZA, 
‘independently of what image they had in society’ (Interview 1). Collaboration with these 
cadres would take place both in the parliament, i.e. with defecting MPs such as Louka 
Katseli and Panayiotis Kouroublis both former PASOK ministers, and by supporting the 
candidacies of well-known former PASOK members such as Olympic champion Sofia 
Sakorafa or indeed Alexis Mitropoulos.  
Another part of the leadership though held the view that: 
‘…relationships of political representation have been broken, political identities have been 
liquidated, what was valid in the ‘80s and ‘90s i.e. rigidity in what people voted, what they 
were...is no longer there in Greek society and therefore we should not do that (collaborate 
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with or put forward former PASOK cadres as candidates) because it is frowned upon. We 
must instead rely on a profile of new, not necessarily young, but of ‘new’ characteristics... 
more citizen, normal person, politically active in society, a participant in social movements, 
etc.’ (Interview 1).  
The leader of the party himself, Alexis Tsipras, was a representative of these ‘new’ 
characteristics: 
‘We had a charismatic leader who is… young, no one can attribute anything to him from the 
past, he has a strong critique against corruption…he comes from a process that is totally 
‘clean’ (Interview 4).   
Tsipras was considered an asset to the party’s electoral appeal from this point of view and 
hence electoral campaigns, increasingly after 2012, were focused to a considerable extent 
on his person, particularly the campaign for the 2014 European elections where Tsipras was 
also the lead candidate for European Commission President put forward by the Party of the 
European Left. For instance, one of the key elements of the campaign for the January 2015 
national elections was the brochure that set out the key features of the Thessaloniki 
Programme which:  
‘was focused on Alexis – the programme is identified with the Prime Minister candidate’ 
(Interview 4)  
This difference of opinion amongst the leadership manifested itself in SYRIZA’s candidate 
selection from 2010 onwards which was characterised by the inclusion of both ‘new faces’ 
active in the radical left and recognisable former PASOK cadres in party lists. This approach 
reflected a compromise amongst the ranks of the leadership but at the same time it diluted 
the message that SYRIZA cadres were ‘new’ to professional politics and hence could be 
trusted to run the country with honesty. 
The credibility that SYRIZA had tried to establish before winning the January 2015 elections 
was tarnished by the failure of its plan (Moschonas 2015). The way the seven month long 
negotiation process with the creditors (February-July 2015) unfolded, the imposition of 
capital controls in July 2015 and the U-turn that SYRIZA was forced to perform by signing 
the Third MoU in August 2015 put a major strain on the government’s ability to lead the 
country out of its financial troubles. The argument that it had the most honest people to take 
responsibility for government was nonetheless still by and large available to the party. In the 
electoral campaign for the September 2015 elections SYRIZA thus attempted to compensate 
for the credibility loss it had suffered by projecting the left’s ‘moral advantage’.  
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In summary, between June 2011 and June 2012, SYRIZA’s strategy underwent a major 
transformation. It moved away from a niche ‘issue ownership’ strategy directed towards 
young voters in two new directions: a ‘protest’ strategy’ that involved both support for protest 
movements and a new populist discourse aimed at mobilising a broad constituency of 
disaffected voters; and a ‘competence’ strategy that saw the party claim government 
responsibility on the grounds that it was more capable to rescue the country and its cadres 
more honest compared to those of the ‘old’ parties that had ruled the country over the 
democratic period. 
 
Explaining success: why SYRIZA won  
Radical left party success often depends on the absence of a strong social democratic 
competitor (Olsen et al 2010). Indeed over the period under examination SYRIZA primarily 
aimed to win over former PASOK voters that distanced themselves from the party en masse. 
In so doing the party faced electoral competition from a significant number of contender 
minor parties on the left , particularly the KKE and DIMAR between 2010 and 2012, to which 
was added The River, a party of the ‘radical centre’, after 2014. Over the 2010-2015 period 
all minor Greek parties faced the same institutional constraints posed by the Greek electoral 
system.  
‘Enhanced proportionality’ reflects an electoral system that couples proportionality with a 50 
(out of a total of 300) seat bonus for the party that receives the largest nationwide share of 
the vote and a three per cent entry threshold to Parliament. This is a system that offers a 
relatively low bar for representation thereby not excluding minor parties with a modest 
nationwide appeal. At the same time by rewarding the first party generously and penalising 
the second party, thus incentivising the polarisation of voters around two potential governing 
alternatives, the system has majoritarian effects. In other words, bar exceptional 
circumstances that would see voters distance themselves from the two major parties to a 
significant extent, such as the ones experienced over the 2010-2015 period, all minor parties 
would be expected to encounter relatively favourable conditions for entry to parliament but 
very serious institutional constraints in achieving major party status.  
Why was SYRIZA’s new strategy more successful in winning votes than the strategies of its 
competitors under similar institutional constraints? It will be argued in this section that 
SYRIZA’s choice of strategy provided a better response to electoral demand compared to 
the choices made by its minor competitors. Furthermore, despite being a minor party 
SYRIZA succeeded in playing a part in shaping the context within which its major 
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competitors’ strategies unfolded. It did so in a way that favoured the success of its own 
strategy.     
 
Meeting Demand 
Four factors on the demand side could have been expected to favour not only SYRIZA but 
also other minor parties that were in competition with SYRIZA, mainly the KKE, DIMAR and 
The River. First, there was a legacy of mass broad political identification with the left in 
Greece going back to the 1940s (EAM) that left and centre-left parties could appeal to and 
have appealed to in the past (Tsakatika 2014). The KKE and DIMAR could lay claim to this 
legacy to the same extent as SYRIZA. Yet SYRIZA came across as the most consistent 
representative of left unity. Not only was it itself a coalition of left wing groups and 
independents (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013), but also called for unity of all left parties 
against the austerity measures and the Memorandum of Understanding. On the other hand 
DIMAR was a split from SYRIZA itself and the KKE turned down all of SYRIZA’s calls for a 
united front proclaiming its own strategy to be superior (Tsakatika 2014). The way in which 
SYRIZA’s protest strategy was crafted seems to have been more convincing to the 
electorate of the left, broadly conceived, because in contrast to its competitors SYRIZA could 
present itself as a unifying, rather than sectarian, political project. 
Second, Eurosceptic attitudes that can be expected to provide fertile ground for minor 
protest parties (Taggart 1998) were on the rise in Greece over the crisis period (Serricchio, 
Tsakatika & Quaglia 2013). Since it was ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ Euroscepticism that was on 
the rise (Clements, Nanou & Verney 2014, p. 263) SYRIZA could be argued to have been in 
a better position than both the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic Communist party and the ‘uncritically’ pro-
European DIMAR and The River to benefit from this upsurge. Indeed, SYRIZA held firm to 
its ‘soft’ Eurosceptic stance throughout the period in question. SYRIZA criticised the 
architecture of EMU and the Eurozone, democracy in European Union and the politics of 
austerity that the Union had ‘constitutionalised’ while making proposals for reform. At the 
same time, despite containing a vocal ‘hard’ Eurosceptic minority, the leadership and the 
majority of the party were consistent in their unquestioning support for Greece’s continuing 
membership of both the European Union and the Eurozone.       
Third, the sharp economic downturn that followed the adoption of the Memorandum, 
including the rise of unemployment and poverty, could have been expected to favour any of 
the minor protest parties, particularly on the left (Kriesi 2014). A new constituency 
(Spourdalakis 2013, p. 106) was argued to have come into play bringing together the 
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disaffected social categories most adversely impacted upon by the economic crisis, that is, 
inhabitants of large urban centres, salaried employees, the economically active population 
and younger age groups (Mavris 2012). The KKE and DIMAR could have appealed to the 
economically disaffected to the same extent that SYRIZA did. DIMAR presented itself as a 
competent and reliable force on the moderate left that could set the country on course to 
economic recovery to the benefit of all. At the same time while being critical of the 
Memoranda of Understanding, DIMAR supported some of their modernising aspects and did 
not decline the invitation to join the Samaras government between 2012-2013 thus being 
more nuanced in its message and less inclined to act as the voice of popular discontent. The 
KKE held steadfast to a protest strategy that appealed to sectors of the working class and 
small business owners whose jobs and incomes had been affected by the crisis but refused 
to provide a medium-term plan in response to the crisis while resisting all invitations to take 
part in government. SYRIZA’s protest and competence strategy seems to have been more 
attractive to the strata that were economically affected by the crisis since it offered both a 
way to express indignation and an immediate plan of action.     
Finally, anti-party sentiments directed against the two major parties primarily on grounds of 
their lack of competence and perceived high levels of corruption had been running high even 
before the crisis (Constandinidis & Tsakatika 2011). These factors could have benefited all 
three of the minor parties mentioned above in electoral terms. DIMAR’s participation in the 
Samaras government between 2012 and 2013 (Interview 2) and the KKE’s refusal to 
distinguish between the old bipartyism and all other parties that had not taken part in 
government, meant that there was only one competitor for SYRIZA on this front. The River, a 
pro-EU party of the ‘progressive radical centre’ (Theodorakis 2016) that appeared two 
months before the 2014 European and regional/local elections emerged with an anti-
establishment agenda directed against the old bipartyism; at the same time it claimed to be 
the vehicle that would bring ‘the worthy’ into politics, citizens who were prominent in their 
professional fields but who had not been involved in politics before. However, unlike the bulk 
of SYRIZA’s elected politicians, many of the candidates that The River put forward in the 
2014 and 2015 elections were not first timers in Greek politics but had been involved in the 
PASOK governments of Kostas Simitis, small groups and parties of the liberal centre that 
had invariably failed to gain parliamentary representation in past decades, or came to The 
River from DIMAR. SYRIZA’s competence strategy which ultimately relied more on honesty 
rather than experience seems to have been more in tune with demand, at least over the 
period in question. 
In summary, SYRIZA’s choice of strategy seems to have met electoral demand factors more 
successfully than the strategies adopted by other minor parties that the party was competing 
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against for votes. It was more convincing in the answers it provided for voters’ growing 
disaffection with PASOK and more broad negative orientations towards the two major 
parties. It was more in tune with Greek citizens’ changing attitudes towards Europe. Finally, 
it offered voters a vehicle to express both their anger against the major parties and the hope 
that there is an alternative to austerity (Karyotis, Pamphilis & Rüdig 2016) that does not 
entail leaving the EU or the Eurozone.  
 
Shaping the Strategic Context 
After the ratification of the first MoU by the Greek Parliament in May 2010 Greek political 
parties divided along two new issue dimensions. These can be identified as the 
Memorandum - anti-Memorandum issue dimension (Dinas and Rori 2012) which combined 
party positions on the economic dimension with party positions on Europe (Katsanidou and 
Otjis 2016) and the ‘old’ versus ‘new’ politics issue dimension which marked out the parties 
that had not been part of governing the country before the economic crisis from those that 
had. Party positions along both issue dimensions cut across the left - right cleavage.  
After the ratification of the first MoU in May 2010 parties divided between those that 
supported the agreement as an opportunity for Greece to reform and remain in Europe 
(PASOK, LAOS) and those that opposed the agreement as detrimental to the Greek 
economy claiming that a renegotiation of the terms associated with the bail-out loan (the 
‘Memorandum’) within Europe was possible (New Democracy, SYRIZA) and a party that 
opposed the agreement calling for eventual voluntary Grexit (KKE). New Democracy under 
PM Samaras had chosen to oppose the First MoU when the later was being ratified in 
Parliament and turn the issue into a main theme of opposition to PASOK (Samaras 2010, pp 
6762-6765). It was in fact not SYRIZA, but New Democracy, a major and influential party 
that engaged in heresthetic manipulation by emphasising and legitimising the Memorandum-
anti-Memorandum issue dimension in Greek politics (Loulis 2012) on the run up to the 2010 
local and regional elections. SYRIZA had also run these elections on an anti-Memorandum 
platform but had been unsuccessful (Verney 2012). New Democracy had effectively 
appropriated the issue (Meguid 2005) leaving little space for the minor party of the left to 
benefit electorally by following a protest strategy directed against government agreement to 
the Memorandum.  
Following the formation of the Papademos government in November 2011, a significant 
realignment along the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum divide took place when New 
Democracy joined the pro-Memorandum camp. The realignment represented a key 
24 
 
opportunity for SYRIZA, which saw its chance to take advantage of New Democracy’s U-turn 
in order to dominate the anti-Memorandum camp. According to Riker’s theory we would 
expect a party that expects to lose its majority to pursue a change in the number of issue 
dimensions. On the one hand, New Democracy, along with PASOK, now the two main 
government partners in a pro-Memorandum government would try to downplay the 
significance of the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension. SYRIZA on the other 
hand, drew on the privileged relationship with the social movements it had developed as part 
of its protest strategy (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013) to maintain the Memorandum-anti-
Memorandum issue dimension as politically salient. In brief, SYRIZA used the social 
mobilisation aspect of its protest strategy in order to keep the Memorandum-anti-
memorandum issue dimension central in the political debate. This in turn rendered the 
parameters of the political debate more amenable to the discursive side of its protest 
strategy.   
A second issue dimension that SYRIZA increasingly appealed to more frequently after New 
Democracy joined the pro-Memorandum ‘camp’ in November 2011, was that between the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ politics (Tsipras 2014). The ‘old’ bipartyism (ND and PASOK) whose 
corrupt clientelist practices were to blame for the state of the country and its government 
‘allies’ (LAOS and DIMAR) on the one hand and the ‘new’ parties that would clean up the old 
regime, unite the people and rescue the country from economic decline, ‘humanitarian crisis’ 
or ‘humiliation’ on the other, were represented by SYRIZA on the left, after 2012 
Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn on the right and after 2014 by The River in the 
centre. SYRIZA’s appeal to the ‘moral advantage’ of the left aimed for it to become the main 
representative and beneficiary of the ‘old’-‘new’ politics issue dimension on the left.  
In the electoral campaign that preceded the September 2015 elections SYRIZA found itself 
in the awkward  position of major party of government that had just agreed to a Third MoU 
while having spent the last few years and built its electoral success by criticising the 
Memorandum and the parties that had agreed to it. In order to avoid defeat, in line with 
Riker’s theory it would need to drop the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension. 
Since no other party among the main opposition parties had an interest in continuing to 
retain the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum as a salient issue dimension SYRIZA was able 
to drop it. It was the ‘old’-‘new’ dimension that SYRIZA would now prop up as the main issue 
dimension along which party competition would take place. SYRIZA emerged as the main 
‘new’ party along the ‘old’-‘new’ issue dimension and having thus fixed the parameters for 
the strategic context in such a way that it was amenable to its competence strategy, it won 
the September 2015 elections by appealing to the left’s ‘moral advantage’. 
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In summary, the success of SYRIZA’s heresthetics can be attributed to its actions in two key 
moments, November 2011 and the summer of 2015. In the first instance, SYRIZA took 
advantage of New Democracy’s shift from an anti- to a pro-Memorandum position to 
maintain the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension at the centre of public debate 
and dominate the anti-Memorandum camp. In the second instance, SYRIZA succeeded in 
imposing the ‘new’-‘old’ politics issue dimension as central, while eliminating the 
Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension. In the first case SYRIZA influenced the 
parameters of public debate in a way that they became more amenable to the success of its 
protest strategy. In the second case it influenced the setup of issue dimensions in such a 
way that the ground was fertile for its competence strategy.  
 
Conclusions 
The present study of SYRIZA’s political strategy makes a contribution to the broader 
literature on the electoral success of minor parties. It highlights the importance of the supply 
side and in particular the strategic choices confronting minor parties. It demonstrates that an 
‘issue ownership’ strategy may well be safe if a minor party aims to consolidate a ‘niche’ in 
the party system, but it has a ‘ceiling’: a minor party needs to claim the big prize in the first 
place if it is to win it. Equally, a protest strategy on its own may help a minor party to mobilise 
a constituency of disaffected voters but it will not suffice for it to become a major party unless 
it claims that it is more competent to govern than its competitors. From a minor party’s point 
of view a competence strategy need not be set out in terms of government experience as a 
junior coalition partner; it may be equally or even more effective when it is set out from the 
opposition on grounds of being a novice who can convince they would do a better job than 
the established major parties and is willing to assume government responsibility.  
SYRIZA’s victory took place against the background of truly exceptional events which 
radically changed the contours of electoral demand in Greece, leading to the total collapse of 
the PASOK vote after 2011. While the singularity of the Greek case is beyond doubt, 
European social democracy is under increasingly harsh electoral competition from a number 
of minor party contenders from across the political spectrum, while its ‘crisis’ has been 
extensively documented in the relevant literature (Keating and McCrone 2013). Therefore, 
the study of SYRIZA’s electoral strategy may well be relevant to understanding the electoral 
threat that radical left challenger parties present for social democratic parties. 
Finally, the analysis of the SYRIZA case also makes a contribution to the study of 
heresthetics by exposing the need to rethink Riker’s art of political manipulation from the 
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perspective of minor parties. It demonstrates that being ‘mere makeweights’, that is, much 
more limited in the extent to which they can influence their strategic environment compared 
to major parties, minor parties’ success can be expected to depend on the skill of their 
leaderships to take advantage of the heresthetic errors made by the major parties. This 
finding complements the current understanding of the ‘manipulation of issue dimensions’ as 
simply involving the introduction of a new salient issue dimension, the elimination of an 
existing issue dimension or the avoidance of the emergence of a new issue dimension. 
These heresthetic manoeuvres are relevant primarily to major parties. When SYRIZA was 
still a minor party in 2011 its main victory lay in leveraging its association with the (anti-
austerity and anti-establishment) Outraged movement in order to maintain the saliency of the 
Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension and to ‘hijack’ the gap left by the shift of 
New Democracy to the pro-Memorandum camp. SYRIZA’s success was very much New 
Democracy’s failure.   
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